Informational Price Cascades and Non-aggregation of Asymmetric Information in Experimental Asset Markets by Jason Shachat & Anand Srinivasan
Informational price cascades and non-aggregation of





We report on experimental markets for a contingent claim asset that eight subjects traded
for nine periods before the state was revealed. There is an informative binary signal that
arrives after each of the first eight trading rounds. In our baseline treatment the realization of
the signal is public information, and in another treatment, market participants are randomly
sequenced and receive the signal as private information. In the latter case, we observe zero
information aggregation and prices lock in on home grown norms, which we call informational
price cascades. We test the fragility of the price cascades in two further treatments. First,
we break the monopoly on each signal by revealing it to two subjects, and then we increase
that number to four. It is only when we inform four participants, or one-half of the market,
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1 Introduction
Ideally asset markets perform important functions such as directing capital to the greatest
wealth creating opportunities, facilitating the efficient sharing of risk, and the accurate
incorporation of diverse and relevant information into market prices. This last function
is commonly referred to as information aggregation and has theoretical foundations in the
hypotheses of rational expectations (Lucas, 1972) and efficient markets (Grossman, 1976).
Traditional tests of whether information aggregates in financial markets have relied upon
indirect inferences usually in the form of testing for profitable trading strategies based on
public information. However, since the market’s information set is never available to the
researcher, it is not possible to directly test for information aggregation using real market
data.
Controlled laboratory experiments do not suffer from this issue, and therefore are well
suited to evaluate information aggregation. One strand of literature (Plott and Sunder, 1988;
Forsythe and Lundholm, 1990; Camerer and Weigelt, 1991; Barner, Feri, and Plott, 2006)
finds strong support favoring information aggregation with short lived assets traded in con-
tinuous double auctions. A second strand of literature conducts experiments on variations of
the rational herding model developed by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), with
the theoretical prediction that individuals would ignore their private information resulting in
informational cascades. Several experimental studies (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Celen and
Kariv, 2004; Kubler and Weizacker, 2004; Goeree, Palfrey, and Rogers, 2007; Alevy, Haigh,
and List, 2007) confirm the theoretical prediction that information fails to aggregate in the
form of cascades and herding. A key institutional feature in these studies is a market maker
who exogenously sets a constant price for the asset. Avery and Zemsky (1998) reformulate
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) model with a market maker who adjusts this
price according to Bayes rule. They show that this change results in full information aggre-
gation and no information cascades.1 Subsequent experimental studies (Sgroi, 2003; Cipriani
and Guarino, 2005, 2009; Drehmann, Oechssler, and Rider, 2005) confirm this prediction and
report greatly reduced herding and informational cascade formation, and thus high levels of
1The prediction of full information aggregation occurs only under some conditions.
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information aggregation.
We report on asset markets experiments that synthesize these two strands of literature;
we adopt the asset and corresponding information structure of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992) and we use the continuous double auction for trading. While accommodating
flexible prices, our setting differs from Avery and Zemsky (1998) and related experiments as
it adheres to the principle of decentralized information (Hurwicz, 1972). A trader’s portfolio
holdings and adjustments, information regarding dividends, and her identity when taking
market actions are all private information. Consequently, traders can only learn from the
observation of public market data such as contract prices and limit orders in the open book.
Replacing social learning by observing the actions of others with learning solely from the
observation of anonymous market actions leads to a dramatic change in the informational
efficiency in the market.
The most dramatic change is that we observe zero information aggregation when informa-
tion signals are private information. In our first set of experiments, we consider two between-
subject treatments: public information in which each signal is observed by all traders, and
private information in which each signal is revealed to one trader (with traders taking turns
at being this insider.) In the private information treatment, there is no information aggrega-
tion, and how this aggregation failure manifests itself is surprising. Within an experimental
session, trades quickly lock into a single price and subsequent contract prices rarely sub-
stantially deviate. We refer to this phenomenon as an informational price cascade because
the lock-in price has zero correlation with the fundamental value of the asset and there is
evidence that arriving private information does not get incorporated into the market. The
persistence of these informational price cascades is quite strong; within a session, these price
norms carry across the conclusion of one asset’s life to a new market repetition in which sub-
jects’ endowments are reset and a new - but identical - contingent asset is traded. However,
while the value at which prices cascade is session specific, different price norms emerge in
different sessions.
Despite market prices failing to incorporate newly arrived private information, we don’t
observe accompanying strong herding in terms of trader’s asset portfolio adjustments. Some
subjects do adjust the number of assets they hold conditional upon their private signals and
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increase their earnings, but there is great variance in these two measures. One might suspect
that insiders will wait before acting on their private signals, but that is only half the story.
Forty-four percent of the time an informed trader participates in one of the first two trades
that occurs after she receives her private signal, while about thirty percent of the time,
the informed trader does not make a contract in that period. So how is it these portfolio
adjustments do not lead to information leaking into market prices? The sequential arrival of
asymmetric information to the market creates a longer lived asset (in discrete time), than of
those traded in the typical continuous double auction information aggregation experiments.
In studies such as Plott and Sunder (1988), assets typically live for one trading period and
all asymmetric information regarding it’s value is endowed to traders prior to the period.
In contrast, our markets start with a common prior for asset value and over the course of
trading, a sequence of eight informative signals are received. This creates an asset that lives
for nine-periods with no dividends other than its terminal value. This creates opportunities
for traders who are not informed to trade and create noise – which they do – despite strong
theoretical reasons they should not (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Tirole, 1982). These noise
traders allow informed traders to exploit their private information without perturbing a
market price norm.
An obvious question is how robust are the informational price cascades we report? Moti-
vated by models of partial aggregation such as Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Kyle (1989),
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Foster and Viswanathan (1996), we make two im-
portant modifications in the experimental design for the private treatment. First, we create
a new treatment where each signal is given to two subjects. By doing this, we remove the
information monopoly held by the informed trader. We do not find any effect of removing
this monopoly on information aggregation. In another treatment, we give each signal to
four subjects. We find partial aggregation in this treatment, supporting the prediction in
some of the above models about the importance of the fraction of informed traders being an
important determinant of aggregation.
The paper proceeds with a description of the experimental design and protocols. We also
develop the hypotheses to be tested in this section. Then. we present the data analysis from
the public and private information treatments in which we establish the zero aggregation and
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price cascade results, and we provide extensive robustness checks on the statistical analysis.
In the penultimate section, we present the results of our two and four person informed trader
sessions which demonstrate the generic nature of price cascades and suggests under what
conditions they can be broken. We conclude with further discussion of how our results inform
various literatures and highlight possible directions for additional study.
2 Experimental design
We present the experimental design in two parts. In the first sub-section, we introduce the
asset, the structure of market signals, and their effect on fundamental value. We also describe
our implementation of the double auction trading institution, and our experimental protocols.
In the second sub-section, we present our four treatments regarding the information structure
of market signals. Then, we discuss relevant models and the major hypotheses they provide.
2.1 Asset structure, market institution, and protocols
Consider a simple asset a that lives for nine periods and possesses no value other than a final
dividend d(a). Market participants hold a common prior that this final dividend is either
zero or one dollar with equal probability. To test for information aggregation, we introduce
informative, but imperfect, signals about the dividend value before periods two through
nine. Each signal is an independent realization of the following probability experiment. If
the dividend is one dollar, the signal is a draw from an urn containing eight red (R) chips
and four(B) black chips. On the other hand, if the dividend is zero, the signal is a draw
from an urn with four red chips and eight black chips. Thus, the probability of drawing
a red chip conditional on a one dollar dividend is two-thirds, Pr(R|d(a) = 1) = 2/3, and
the probability of drawing a red chip conditional on a zero dollar dividend is one-third,
Pr(R|d(a) = 0) = 1/3. For any sequence of realized signals, the Bayes rule calculation for




, where k is the number of R
less the number of B signals. For the relevant values of k, Table 1 provides the corresponding
posterior probabilities that d(a) = 1, or in other words, the conditional expected value of
the dividend, E [d(a)|k]. For our purposes, the fundamental value of a at every point in time
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is its expected value given conditional all realized signals up to that point.
We populate the market for the asset a with eight traders, endowing each trader with
five dollars of currency and five units of the asset. For all nine periods in the life of the asset,
traders have the opportunity to buy and sell the asset amongst themselves via a continuous
double auction. During a market period, traders can take the following actions: submit bids
to purchase, submit asks to sell, make market sales (agreeing to sell at the current highest
bid), and make market buys (agreeing to purchase at the current lowest ask). While these
actions are for a single unit, traders can submit multiple bids and asks, and make multiple
purchases and sales within a period. When a market period closes, all remaining bids and
asks expire.
There are several rules regulating a trader’s actions. The bid-ask spread is the difference
between the current lowest ask and the current highest bid, and any new bid or ask must
reduce this spread. Specifically, a trader can submit a bid at anytime; however, her new
bid must exceed the current highest bid. Likewise, a trader can freely submit an ask, on
the condition it reduces the current lowest ask. Successfully submitted bids and asks are
stored in a public bid-ask queue. A trader can freely retract one of her bids (asks) from the
queue as long as it is not the current highest (lowest) one. Whenever a trader submits a bid,
her available currency is temporarily reduced by the amount of the bid. In the same vein,
when a trader submits an ask, the number of her available units is temporarily reduced by
one. We do not allow short sales by prohibiting asks and market sales when a trader does
not have an available unit. Similarly, we prohibit bids and market buys without sufficient
available currency.
A trade occurs when either the current lowest bid is accepted by a market sale, or the
current lowest ask is accepted by a market buy. Subsequently, the associated bid or ask
is removed from the bid-ask queue, and the corresponding temporary adjustments to the
available currency become permanent. The contract price is then added to a sequential list
of current period prices which is displayed to all traders.
The only element of the microeconomic system (Smith, 1982) we have yet to specify is the
knowledge each trader possesses about the market signals, and this is our treatment variable.
Prior to describing our treatments, we give the common set of experimental protocols. We
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conducted all of our sessions in the National University of Singapore (NUS) Department
of Marketing’s Behavioral Research Computer laboratory.2 We executed the continuous
double auction trading mechanics using the Marketlink software application for running
market experiments (Cox and Swarthout, 2006), publically available at the Econport website
(http://www.econport.org). We augmented the computerized trading procedures with hand-
run protocols to induce the various information treatments.
We recruited participants through e-mails to the undergraduate majors in the NUS De-
partment of Economics and undergraduate majors and Master of Business Administration
students from the NUS School of Business. Participants were told the experiment would last
approximately two and a half hours, given a ten Singapore dollar payment for showing up
on time, and also privately paid any monies earned in the experiment. All amounts in the
experiment, and this description, are in Singapore dollars. There was no conversion between
experimental and local currencies as is often done. Each subject participated in only one
session.
Every experimental session had eight subjects. A session started with a public reading
of the instructions, followed by a practice market consisting of three trading periods (the
earnings from which subjects were not paid). Subjects then participated in a sequence of
three markets for which they earned money. Each of these markets consisted of nine 90
second trading periods. Prior to period one, the subjects could observe us toss a coin that
determined the asset’s dividend value and the composition of the urn. However, the outcome
of the coin toss was not shown to the subjects. After period nine, we announced the realized
dividend value, and a subject’s earnings for that market was her final currency balance plus
the number units of the asset she held at the conclusion of trading, multiplied by the dividend
value. All subjects had common knowledge of this structure. Note, that there was no carry
over of currency or asset units across markets, and a subject started each market with a new
endowment. A subject’s total payment was the show-up fee and the sum of her earnings in
the three markets.
2This laboratory is especially designed to conduct research experiments with individual computers housed
in privacy carrels that prevent subjects from viewing each other’s computer screens and also discourage
communication between subjects.
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2.2 Informational treatments and major hypotheses
Our experimental treatments concern how signals were disseminated to the subjects. The
following list provides the treatments and the implementing protocols. Note that the relevant
protocols were common knowledge to all subjects within a treatment and fully disclosed in
the publicly read instructions.
1. Public Information (PUB): All subjects publicly observe every signal. Prior to
trading in periods two through nine, a single chip was drawn at random in view of the
subjects. The color of the chip was shown to all traders and then returned to the urn.
After the value of the dividend was announced, at the conclusion of market period
nine, we allowed subjects to verify the contents of the urn.
2. Private Information (PVT): We used the same protocols as the PUB treatment
with the following modifications. In each market, subjects were randomly and anony-
mously ordered one through eight to determine the sequence of informed traders. Prior
to trading in periods two through nine, the color of the randomly selected chip was
only revealed to that period’s informed trader. To preserve anonymity, an envelope was
distributed to every subject. The informed trader’s envelope contained a slip of paper
with the color of the selected chip written on it, and all other envelopes contained a
slip of paper with the printed word ‘None.’ The envelopes were recollected after the
subjects inspected the contents.
3. Private Information with Two Informed Traders (2SIG): This treatment fol-
lows the same protocols as the PVT treatment except that we revealed each signal
to two subjects rather than one. The subjects were formed into four anonymous and
randomly ordered pairs. The ordered pairs took turns being the informed trader pair
for periods two through five. Within a pair, the two subjects did not know each other’s
identity. Then, for periods six through nine we generated a new random set of pairs.
Thus, a subject knew that she would observe one of the first four signals, and then ob-
serve another signal from the set of the last four signals. Further, she knew that when
she observed a draw from the urn, exactly one other subject simultaneously observed
the same draw.
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4. Private Information with Four Informed Traders (4SIG): This treatment was
the same as 2SIG except that four subjects rather than two observe each draw. In
this case the eight subjects were divided into random groups of four for the market
period pairs two/three, four/five, six/seven, and eight/nine. Thus a subject knew she
observed the draw once in each of those pairs of market periods.
We adopted a between subject experimental design: each experimental session was ex-
posed to a single information treatment. Table 2 provides details regarding our experiment
design such as the number of sessions per treatment and the acronyms will use for each
treatment.
Before discussing some of the motivations and hypotheses generated by the differences
between these treatments, let’s consider some of the constants. First, the set of feasible
allocations is the same across the four treatments: the same number of traders each endowed
with five units each of currency and assets. Second, the total information content of the
market does not vary as there are exactly eight independent draws from the urn with identical
timing. With a constant set of feasible allocations and information structure, the rational
expectations equilibrium is the same for every market in all treatments.
2.2.1 Rational expectations versus informational cascades
In terms of hypotheses development, we will progress from full revelation of all information
in a rational expectations setting to successively lower degrees of information revelation.
In our setting, the rational expectation equilibrium is that, for every possible history of
signal realizations, the equilibrium price equals the expected dividend and excess demand
for the asset is zero. Implicit in the zero excess demand condition is that each market
participant calculates the expected dividend conditioning upon all market signals observed
by any market participant, not just the signals she observes. Radner (1979) showed that
such fully revealing equilibrium are generically rational expectations equilibrium in finite
state settings like ours. Moreover, the core idea that competitive equilibrium prices in
commodity markets incorporate all relevant information no matter how sparsely held in the
economy was first championed in Hayek (1945). Later, Grossman (1976) extended it to the
case of uncertainty and assets. These ideas are the basis of our first hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1. Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Market prices equal the fundamental
value as defined by all realized market signals.
There are two effects governing the price dynamics in the rational expectations equi-
librium. First, whenever a market participant observes a new market signal, the resulting
change in value results in a perfectly correlated change in price. Second, there is price ef-
ficiency such the price level always equals the market fundamental value, and there is no
opportunity to increase expected earnings through trade. A market outcome can fail to be
price efficient - and thus failing to implement a rational expectation equilibrium - but still be
informationally efficient, which we define as the above correlation being exactly equal to one.
For example, consider a market dynamic in which price adjustments are exactly one-half of
any change in fundamental value. While this would fail price efficiency, there still remains
a clear one-to-one mapping between the path of market prices and the sequence of realized
signals. So from observing the public market data, we could infer all of the signals regardless
of whether it is privately received or publicly received. So, our second hypothesis relaxes the
assumption of price efficiency and only addresses information efficiency.
Hypothesis 2. Correlation efficiency: The correlation between market prices and funda-
mental value is one.
Next, we relax the above efficiency concept even further, by recognizing that the market
prices of assets may be influenced by trader’s biases in judgement (Hirshleifer, 2001). In
particular, the rational expectations equilibrium for our experiment relies heavily on the
assumption that conditional probabilities are updated according to Bayes rule when market
signals are realized. Past experimental studies have shown that asset prices generated in
markets are not immune to evaluation errors such as base rate fallacy (Ganguly, Kagel,
and Moser, 2000) or the representative heuristic (Camerer, 1987). For our next hypothesis,
we suppose that whatever systematic judgment errors subjects make, they are the same in
all our treatments. This allows us to consider the PUB treatment as our baseline, and if
information aggregates when it is asymmetric, then market prices should all follow the same
data generating process.
Hypothesis 3. Comparative efficiency: Pricing Dynamics are the same in all treatments.
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From a theoretical standpoint, the above hypotheses essentially modify the full infor-
mation rational expectations hypothesis to one in which participants are allowed to deviate
from rationality in terms of how they use information to update their beliefs and the corre-
sponding impact this has on equilibrium prices. However, it assumes that such judgement
biases have no effect on the ability of the market to aggregate diffuse information.
Next, motivated by the seminal paper on rational herding by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer,
and Welch (1992), if individuals do not act according to their signals, then the market price
will not reveal any information and the prices will be in the form of an informational cascade.
To the extent that cascades are present, this would also imply that information aggregation
will be significantly lower in the private treatment relative to the public treatment. In fact,
with a cascade, information aggregation should be zero subsequent to the onset of a cascade.
Hypothesis 4. Informational Cascade: Prices in the private treatment will be in the form
of informational cascades where prices do not reveal any information.
While the the model by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) was developed to
explain rational herding, the model by Avery and Zemsky (1998), strive to make the model
more fitting to that of a traditional asset market by allowing the price to adjust in a way that
reflects the information that can be inferred by an outsider from its holder. In this case, the
result that they obtain is that prices again become fully revealing and we would recover the
rational expectations equilibrium. Thus, if the mechanism of flexible prices makes actions
fully revealing of signals, we would not see any cascades and therefore, this would imply that
one of hypotheses 1, 2, or 3 should hold.
2.2.2 Partial Aggregation hypotheses
Purely from a theoretical standpoint, the hypotheses developed above have two extreme
predictions, either full aggregation or no aggregation. In this sub-section, we briefly survey
models that would imply partial aggregation. A seminal paper by Diamond and Verrecchia
(1981) predicts the result of partial aggregation of prices in an environment where there are
multiple sources of uncertainty, namely information and noise about endowments. While the
above paper does not formally model the mechanism of the market, another seminal paper
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by Kyle (1985)does and obtains the result that a monopolist informed trader with perfect
information about an asset’s liquidation value would trade patiently in such a manner that
prices only partially aggregate information. However, this paper’s market structure does not
exactly match the experimental setting in this paper, one of the important differences being
that the insider has perfect information on the asset’s liquidation value.
However, in another model that is closer to the experimental setting in this paper, Kyle
(1989) considers informed rational traders with imperfect information about an asset’s fi-
nal value, non-informed rational traders, and pure noise traders who trade a risky asset
by simultaneously submitting excess demand functions, from which market clearing prices
and allocations are determined. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium generates prices that only par-
tially aggregate information. A key insight is that informed traders dampen their net excess
demand, which has the effect of under revealing their information but also creates the op-
portunity for excess returns. More over, there is a comparative static result which states
the greater the number of informed traders, the more price incorporates that information.
Likewise, Foster and Viswanathan (1996) develop a multi-period version of the model de-
veloped in Kyle (1985) and find that insiders would trade patiently with over many periods
with partial information revelation. In our setting, this suggests the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5. The relative ranking of information aggregation from lowest to highest is
PVT, 2SIG, and 4SIG.
In contrast to the above, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) generalize the Kyle (1985)
model along the dimension of studying the effect of multiple insiders. This is a multi-period
model in which the realization of asymmetric information occurs prior to the market (unlike
our sequential information realizations). In the equilibrium, if more than one trader observes
a signal (where the signal, as in Kyle (1985) is fully revealing of the assets final value), insiders
compete away the informational rents and the market price fully reveals the signal. This
suggests any lack of information aggregation we observe in our PVT treatment should return
when we break the monopolies on the draws from the urn. To the extent that this result is
applicable to our experimental setting, this would imply the following.
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Hypothesis 6. Informational Monopoly: there is less than full information aggregation in
the PVT, but full aggregation in both 2SIG and 4SIG.
3 Empirical analysis of prices cascades
In this section, we present analysis of the PUB and PVT data and test our first four hypothe-
ses. We start with a presentation of contract prices and paths of fundamental value for a
typical PUB and a typical PVT experimental session. Figure 1 is a 2×3 array of graphs, with
rows corresponding to experimental sessions and the columns to the three market sequence
within a session. In this figure, the top row corresponds to one of the PUB sessions, PUB4,
and the bottom row to one of the PVT sessions, PVT6. The horizontal axis of each market
graph measures time, the vertical lines indicate market period closings. A dot represents a
contracts by its time stamp and price (the vertical axis value.) The step function tracks the
fundamental value given realized urn draws and as is calculated according to Table 1. At the
top of each period, we give the total number of trades within that period. In Figures 2-5,
we provide similar figures for all sessions of the PUB and PVT treatments.
Consider session PUB4 in the first row of Figure 1. Trading in Market 1 starts with a
possible bubble. In the first three periods there are several trades exceeding the maximum
possible dividend of one dollar. It turns out the dividend in this market is zero, every signal
was black, and the fundamental value correspondingly decrements each period. While the
adjustments of prices track this value, the actual level of transaction prices approach fun-
damental value only around Period 7. This is consistent with other studies that generally
document that subjects do not perfectly update according to Bayes rule (Grether, 1980;
Camerer, 1987; Charness and Levin, 2005). In Markets 2 and 3, as the subjects gain experi-
ence, we find successively smaller and shorter duration bubbles, which is consistently found
in other experimental studies (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988; Dufwenberg, Lindqvist,
and Moore, 2005; Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair, 2007). Subsequently, the trends of prices
and values are similar, although with some noise.
The PVT6 session, second row of Figure 1, has markedly different price dynamics. In
Market 1, prices almost always exceed fundamental value, but never exceed one dollar. More
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importantly, there is no obvious responsiveness of prices to value. As the markets progress,
the transactions lock in to a trading price unrelated to the value, and fail to adjust to
subsequent changes in value. We refer to such a price lock-in as an informational price
cascade. Consistent trading at such a home grown price norm makes it very difficult to
for market participants to infer the private - but valuable - information observed by others.
Also, it is quite remarkable how this price cascade, and those in other sessions, span across
market incidences even though it is common knowledge that endowments are reset and asset
dividends are drawn anew. Inspection of the data in the Figures 4 and 5 will confirm these
informational price cascades arise in almost all sessions for the private treatment.
The PVT6 session is also interesting because it is one of the few instances in which the
price cascade breaks and information appears to flood back into the market. Consider the
last trading period of Market 3. Here, the period’s informed trader had already taken as long
a position in the asset as her budget constraint allowed before observing a Black signal. The
trader appears to panic, quickly selling units at prices below the established norm. Thus,
despite only have observed the one piece of information, the trader has possibly speculated
on a disproportionately large decrease in fundamental value.
3.1 Univariate analysis of price-fundamental value relationship
We proceed to quantify the informational efficiency, or the apparent lack off, suggested by
visual inspection of the data. As implied by Hypothesis 2, a basic indication that prices in-
corporate information should be a positive correlation between price and fundamental value.
Table 3 presents simple univariate correlations of fundamental value and each trade price
stratified by treatment and market repetition. This correlation is computed incorporat-
ing all trades within each trading period and computing its correlation to the fundamental
value in the given period, where the fundamental value is determined by the prior dividend
probabilities and any realized draws from the urn.
The correlations are virtually zero in the PVT sessions, while strictly positive and quickly
increasing in the PUB sessions. In the public sessions, the correlation between value and
traded prices rises from 0.29 in Market 1 to 0.88 in the final market. The hypothesis that
the correlation is zero is soundly rejected in all the markets. In contrast, the PVT market
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correlations are not insignificantly different from zero in Markets 1 and 3, and negative in
market 2. Further, the correlations are not growing across the markets. These correlation
computations support the general notion that prices in the PUB treatment respond to signals
whereas prices in the PVT treatment do not.
Figure 6 presents this correlation on a period by period basis within each market for all
sessions in each treatment. We take the mean, median and closing price for each period to
compute the correlations with value across sessions within a treatment. Thus, for this figure,
correlations are computed based on a single price statistic per trading period per session.3 In
the first period, the fundamental value is always one-half, hence there is zero variance in the
first period fundamental value. Cosequently, the correlation in the first period is always zero.
Clearly after period four, with all three measures of price, the correlations of value and price
in the PUB treatment display a strongly increasing pattern, and by Market 3, the correlations
approach one. In contrast, the correlations in the PVT treatment are close to zero and do
not display any distinct trend. In fact, as the number of periods increase (i.e., number of
signals increase), the correlations often decrease, sometimes becoming negative. Unlike in
the PUB sessions, Market 3 does not show any faster or greater degree of convergence relative
to Market 1.
Result 1. Hypothesis 2, and information aggregation, fails in the PVT treatment; the corre-
lation between price and value is zero However, in the PUB treat the correlation approaches
one in the latter stages of a session.
The presented correlation measures capture the degree to which prices adjust with
changes in fundamental value; however, they do not inform to how well prices match the fun-
damental value. We refer to ability of prices to accurately reflect fundamental value as price
efficiency. We would like an objective measure of the difference in the price efficiency between
the PUB and PVT treatments. To this end, we define two metrics of pricing inefficiency in
this market.
First, we define pricing inefficiency as the absolute value of the deviation of price from
3In the PUB and PVT treatments, there were 216 periods in total across all sessions and markets (total
of eight sessions for each treatment with nine periods per market and three markets per session). Out of
this, there were no trades in five and six periods in the PUB and PVT treatments respectively.
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value expressed as a percentage of value. With perfectly price efficient markets, this should
equal zero and larger values would imply greater degrees of inefficiency. This measurement
gives some idea of the relative inefficiency of the PVT treatment relative to the PUB treat-
ment. Panel A in Table 4 gives an estimate of these magnitudes. For the PUB treatment,
the Market 3 pricing inefficiency is around 50% whereas in the PVT treatment, it is around
140%. To ensure that these results are not driven by large errors in the closing periods for
which the fundamental value approaches zero, we also report the simple average absolute de-
viation, without scaling by value in the denominator. The results using this second measure
of inefficiency (Table 4, Panel B) shows a similar pattern but greatly increased efficiency.
As a basis of comparison, we compute a benchmark by calculating the level of inefficiency
had all trades occurred at the price of fifty cents, which is we call the naive pricing. As can be
seen, the PUB treatment has lower inefficiency than the naive pricing, more so in Markets
2 and 3. In contrast, the PVT treatment has greater inefficiency even relative to naive
pricing, which implies that the cascades are even worse than an equilibrium where there
is no information given to participants. The above suggest that not only does correlation
efficiency fail, the comparative efficiency of the public and private treatments (Hypothesis
3) is also rejected based on these univariate tests. However, we will further test these two
hypotheses, correlation efficiency and comparative efficiency, in a multivariate setting to
demonstrate this.
3.2 Regression analysis of price dynamics and information aggre-
gation
The above univariate results suggest that the PVT markets have significantly less information
aggregation and greater price inefficiencies that the PUB markets. However, this does not
provide credence to prices being unbiased as well as correlated with fundamental value in the
PUB treatment. Nor does the lack of correlation indicate that there are information price
cascades of the nature that we speculate occur in PVT sessions. To provide further evidence
on the first three hypotheses - rational expectations (hypothesis 1), correlation efficiency
(hypothesis 2), and comparative efficiency (hypothesis 3), we consider the following simple
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model for determination of price changes.
∆Psmt = α + β∆Vsmt + εsmt, (1)
where s denotes the session number (one through eight), m the market repetition (one
through three), and t the trading period (two through nine).
Under Hypothesis 1 of Rational Expectations Equilibrium, we should find that α equals
zero and β equals one. Under Hypothesis 2, one does not need α to be zero as this would
simply imply a lack of matching of the mean changes of the prices and mean changes of
value. What would be the implication for β? In particular, if the volatility of the dependent
and independent variables were equal, then by the definition of the regression coefficient, a
correlation coefficient of one would imply that β should also be one. On the other hand, if
this were not true, the correlation could be one, but β can be different from one. For testing
hypothesis 2, we use this less restrictive test of correlation efficiency. If we reject correlation
efficiency with the weaker hypothesis test of β different from zero, this is a strong rejection.
Under comparative efficiency, we should find that β for the public and private treatments
should be equal.
Table 5 gives the results of this test for both the PUB and PVT treatments.4 First, we
confirm our first result there is no information aggregation in the PVT sessions as β is not
significant in this case. However, in the PUB treatment β is significant but we can reject
the null hypothesis that it is one. Also note that the intercept term is different from zero in
both treatments, and a joint test that α = 0 and β = 1 is rejected as well. Hence, we have
our second result.
Result 2. We reject the rational expectations equilibrium in both the PUB and PVT treat-
ments.
Further, the results in Table 5, Panel C shows that the PVT treatment has significantly
lower aggregation of information relative to the PUB treatment. This implies that we also
4In the public and PVT treatments, there were 216 periods in total of trading across all sessions and all
markets (total of 8 sessions for each treatment with 9 periods per market and 3 markets per session) Out of
this, in the public market, there were 5 periods with no trading and there were 6 periods with no trading in
the PVT treatment.
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reject that the comparative efficiency of PUB and PVT treatments (Hypothesis 3).
The specification of Equation 1 and the associated hypothesis on its parameter values
impose both informational efficiency - i.e., there exists a one-to-one relationship between the
changes in prices and fundamental value that incorporates all information regardless of how
disparate - and price efficiency. We now consider an alternative empirical specification that
better delineates these two efficiencies. Motivated in part from the results in Figures 1- 3
where it appears that public markets react with a lag, we modify the empirical specifications
to model the price process rather than change in prices from one period to the next.
Psmt = αs + β0∆Vsmt + β1∆Vsm,t−1 + β2Psm,t−1 + εsmt (2)
Apart from including the lagged change in value as an explanatory variable, another
important change in this specification relative to the previous one is that we include session
specific intercepts, αs. Given that the intercept captures the average pricing error, allowing
it to vary across sessions could possibly increase the magnitude of the slope coefficients. A
second more important reason for allowing for session specific intercepts is that it will allow
us to test for the possibility of informational cascades..
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of estimating Equation 2 separately for the PUB and
PVT treatments. For considering the appropriate data for the dependent variable, we report
the results of using the mean, median and closing price as different dependent variables.
These estimations, and subsequent ones, are estimated by feasible generalized least squares
with session specific variances because we generally reject the hypothesis of equal variances
in each session for both the PUB and PVT treatments.5 We also test, but do not report, for
autocorrelations using the Breusch-Pagan test and do not find evidence for autocorrelation
in the error terms for all our presented specifications.
With respect to the PUB treatment (Table 6), we find a significant effect for change
in value for both the current period, ∆Vsmt, as well as for the previous period, ∆Vsm,t−1,
suggesting delayed impact of information on prices. Approximately only fifty percent of
5The null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is not rejected in all specifications. For example, in the PUB
treatment with mean price as the dependent variable, homoscedasticity is not rejected. Likewise, for the
PVT treatment with closing price, the hypothesis of equal session specific variances is not rejected. However,
to be consistent, we choose the same method of estimation for all specifications.
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the change in fundamental value resulting from a urn draw is realized in the current price,
while another thirty percent of this change in value is incorporated by the price of the
subsequent period. The estimates for the coefficient on lagged price range from 0.91 to
0.96. Each of these estimated coefficients is significantly different from 1 and standard tests
reject the presence of a unit root.6 Next, note that the intercept is insignificantly different
from zero for the public market, suggesting that adding the lagged change in value allows a
greater explanatory power. Furthermore, using an alternative unreported specification with
session-specific intercepts, a Wald test of the session specific intercepts being different from
each other is not rejected. Accordingly, for all subsequent estimation, we use only a single
intercept term for the PUB sessions.
Next, in Table 7, we examine the estimation results for the PVT treatment. We find
a dramatic departure from the PUB treatment results. In particular, the coefficients of
change in value in the current period, ∆Vsmt, and the lagged change in value, ∆Vsm,t−1, are
statistically insignificant. Thus, neither current information nor lagged information has any
effect on prices. The impact of the lagged price is also significantly lower relative to the
PUB treatment. The R2 are also significantly lower relative to the PUB market with values
between 61% and 77%. Thus, the results that rational expectations, correlation efficiency and
comparative efficiency continue to be rejected with this alternative empirical specification of
price determination.
Even more striking, the session specific intercepts are significantly different from zero
and from each other. We interpret this result (session specific intercepts different from zero
and different from each other) as more formal statistical evidence for the presence of price
cascades in the private treatment. Specifically, this result suggests that prices in the PVT
treatment are session specific mean reversion processes. The corresponding stationary points
are the home grown price norms at which informational price cascades form. Let’s consider
the stationary price for a PVT session, denoted Ps. Once an informational price cascade
forms, i.e. a stationary point reached,
Psmt = αs + β2Psm,t−1 + εsmt.
6Due to the small number of observations in each session, these unit root tests are conducted by taking
all the end of period observations of each treatment and stacking them together.
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Thus, a non zero intercept implies the presence of a long run steady state price as long
as β2 is less than one. We report the calculated stationary price for each session in the last
column of Table 7, and inspection of the price plots in Figures 4 and 5 confirms the accuracy
of how the stationary prices match the level of the price cascades. In our calculation of the
stationary price, we use the coefficients from the regression on the median price because
it always results in a value that lies between the same calculations based upon the mean
and closing price regressions. Note that the difference between these calculated values is
never more than five cents. In summary, the fact that every PVT session specific intercept
is significantly positive provides strong evidence of informational cascades. In contrast, the
PUB session intercepts are jointly not significantly different from zero. Thus, not only do we
document lack of information aggregation, we provide a possible mechanism for the presence
of lack of aggregation, namely that there are information price cascades. We summarize the
regression analysis with the statement of our next two results.
Result 3. We reject correlation efficiency (hypothesis 2) for the PVT treatment. We reject
that the comparative aggregation of the PUB and PVT treatments are equal (hypothesis 3).
Result 4. The non-aggregation of information in the PVT treatment manifests itself as
informational price cascades. Hypothesis 4 is supported.
3.3 Robustness checks of regression results
Potentially we have omitted some important confounding factors in our regression analysis
of price dynamics. In this subsection, we investigate the robustness of these results to such
confounding factors. In particular, we assess the possibility price bubbles - often observed in
the early stages of a session - influence information aggregation, and also evaluate whether
the experience subjects gain over their participation in the three market leads to increased
information aggregation.
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Figures 2-5 show that bubbles frequently occur at least in initial trading periods and
initial markets. Bubbles are often observed and well studied in market experiments for long
lived assets, see Porter and Smith (2008) for a recent survey. The presence of bubbles in
this experiment may have consequences for our results regarding information aggregation
and price efficiency. First, if prices do in fact adjust appropriately to information outside of
a bubble, then experiencing a bubble within a session would result in errors at least in the
estimates of the constant coefficient. Second, structurally, rational participants observing
a bubble may switch from evaluating the asset according to its fundamental value to its
speculative potential, as documented in Hirota and Sunder (2007). This could impact the
marginal effect of change in value on price (or change in price). Consequently, it is possible
the lack of aggregation in the PVT treatment and the partial price efficiency in the PUB
treatment are partly driven by such bubble effects.
To test these notions, we need a clear definition of what constitutes a bubble. In the
popular press, as well as academic literature, bubbles are usually defined as large positive
deviations of traded prices from fundamental value, where fundamental value is usually
estimated. In the current context, since value can be precisely known, and this deviation
can also be estimated precisely, we are still left with a choice as to what constitutes a ‘large’
deviation. Further, for the private treatment, the lack of aggregation may imply in some
cases that this deviation is large without participants necessarily acting in an irrational
manner in terms of switching from fundamental to speculative valuation.
Therefore, the bubble definition that we use is one in which all participants can definitely
identify price has exceeded fundamental value regardless of the belief about the signals
observed by other participants or how new information is used to update the expected value
of the dividend. Namely, we define a trade strictly above one dollar as a bubble trade.
Given the common knowledge of the dividends by all participants, no belief structure would
support this valuation. Using this definition, we present some summary statistics for the
presence of bubble trades by market and by treatment in Table 8.
For both treatments, bubbles are present to a greater degree in the first market relative
to the third market. This is consistent with prior literature that suggests that bubbles gener-
ally reduce with participant experience (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams, 1988; Dufwenberg,
21
Lindqvist, and Moore, 2005; Smith, van Boening, and Wellford, 2000). However, the preva-
lence of bubble trades is lower in the private treatment relative to the public treatment. This
provides preliminary evidence against the notion that bubbles may be causing the results on
the lack of aggregation in the PVT treatment versus the PUB treatment.
To further investigate this, we create a period specific bubble dummy Bsmt that takes
a value of one if 50% or more of the trades in a given period take place at a price above
one, and zero otherwise.7 We modify the empirical specification in Equation 2 to add a
bubble dummy, as well as interactions of the bubble dummy with the change in value, and
the lagged bubble dummy with the lagged change in values - allowing for lagged impact of
bubbles on information aggregation. Specifically, the equation estimated is of the following
form,
Psmt = αs+β0∆Vsmt+β1∆Vsm,t−1+β2Psm,t−1+β3Bsmt+β4Bsmt∗∆Vsmt+β5Bsm,t−1∗∆Vsm,t1+εsmt.
In contrast to Table 7, we use only the closing price as the dependent variable as the
contemporaneous bubble indicator can be used as an independent variable only in this case.
By adding the bubble dummy, we can capture the average impact of bubbles on the intercept,
and by interacting with the change in value and lagged changed in value, we can examine
the impact of bubbles on information aggregation. If bubbles were an important factor in
the lack of aggregation results, we should expect to find that β4 and β5 should be negative
and significant, and β0 should become positive and significant with an estimate closer to
1 relative to table 7. We also estimate a similar model by interacting bubbles with price
changes in the difference specification as in Equation 1.
The results in Table 9 show otherwise. β0, the coefficient on ∆V , continues to be insignif-
icant for the PVT treatment. Interaction terms of the bubble dummy with change in value
or lags of these are not significant, indicating that the presence of bubbles does not impact
information aggregation. Further, the session specific intercepts continue to be significant
(results not shown in the table), and different from each other, showing that the cascading
effect documented earlier is robust to the impact of bubbles. The insignificance of bubbles
7This indicator is computed excluding the last trade of the given period as we will be using the closing
price as the dependent variable in the empirical specification.
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continues to be true in the difference specification. The results for the PUB treatment is
similar. In other unreported regressions, we also investigate an alternative definition of bub-
ble using a positive deviation of price from value by 50% or more to define a bubble trade.
The results are very similar to that found using the above definition of bubble trades.
Table 9 on the incidence of bubbles suggests that bubbles decrease in the second and
third markets relative to the first market. The above suggests that market participants may
be learning to aggregate information better as well with trading experience. To investigate
this, we have a similar empirical specification to equation 2 where we interact the market
number with the change in value. The results presented in Table 10, show some evidence
for learning in the PUB treatment. The point estimates for the impact of change in value
are greater for Markets 2 and 3 relative to Market 1, even though the differences are not
statistically significant. In contrast, the results for the PVT market shows absolutely no
pattern. Thus, learning across markets does not explain the finding of a lack of aggregation
in the PVT treatment.
3.4 Portfolio adjustments
We now shift from the analysis of prices to addressing some natural questions regarding
the subjects’ portfolio adjustments and how they utilize their private information. For
example, given the presence of informational price cascades, do traders simply disregard their
private information and select asset holdings unconditional upon their private information,
in other words do they herd? Do traders with correct information outperform those who
don’t? Do traders act upon their information when they receive it, or are they strategic
and delay trading in order to not reveal and better exploit it? If traders successfully adjust
their portfolios to take advantage of their information, how do they do so without leaking
information into the market and breaking a price cascade?
If subjects exploit informational advantages, we should expect to see the final number
asset units held to differ conditional on whether a subject observed a Red or Black draw.
On the other hand, if subjects simply herd we should see no such differences. In Table 11
we report the average number of asset units held at the conclusion of a market conditional
upon market number and signal type observed, as well as the standard deviation for each
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of these statistics. Using the endowment of five units of the assets as a benchmark, those
with who receive a Black signal reduce their holdings by approximately one unit and those
who receive a Red signal add about one unit. This would suggest subjects are not herding,
except the standard deviation are quite large and we can’t reject the hypothesis that average
final asset holdings are not the same for both Black and Red signal receivers.
Of course, examining the final asset holdings is not a complete picture, traders could
increase their portfolio value (assets and currency) through effective trading which could
manifest itself through effective currency accumulation as well as adjustment in asset hold-
ings. So we compare the subjects’ market earnings, currency plus terminal dividends of held
assets, according to the true dividend and the observed signal. We report this market-by-
market in Table 12. In this table, we segregate the individuals by the type of signal that
they received - red or black. There is some evidence that subjects do use there informa-
tion to earn more. When the dividend is zero, those who receive a Black signal earn about
forty-nine cents more than the autarky outcome (simply holding the endowment), and those
who receive a Red signal lose eighty-nine cents on average. When the dividend is one dol-
lar, the result is almost symmetric, with those who observe a Black draw on average lose
eighty-seven cents, and the those who observe a Red draw gain fifty cents on average. Once
again, the standard deviation on these statistics is quite high and none of the differences are
statistically significant.
It turns out the high standard deviations in asset holdings and market earnings arise
from an important heterogeneity in how subjects choose portfolios. In Figure 7, we plot
the empirical CDF’s of asset holdings conditional on receiving a Red or Black signal. There
are several features worth noting. First, the support for both distributions is quite large;
zero to thirteen for those who observe a Black signal, and zero to fifteen for those whose
observe a Red signal. There many people choosing corner solutions, such as the twenty
percent of the Black signal receivers and ten percent of the Red signal receivers who hold no
units of the asset. Finally, casual inspection suggest the empirical CDF of Red first order
stochastically dominates that of Black. We quantify this conclusion with a nonparametric
hypothesis test suggested by Barrett and Donald (2003) which rejects the absence of first
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order stochastic dominance for any plausible level of significance.8 Evidently some traders
adjust their portfolios based upon their signals and benefit, while at the same time there
is overall tremendous variation in portfolio adjustments. It turns out that this variation is
what allows traders to utilize information without transferring it to the market.
3.5 Timing and informational content of market actions
How are some subjects able to use their private information to make profitable portfolio
adjustments without transmitting this information to the market? One conjecture is that a
subject may wait to act on such information so as to not transmit the signal by his actions,
and thus erodes its value (Foster and Viswanathan, 1994, 1996). As we will demonstrate,
this conjecture is partially wrong as many informed subjects quickly trade upon receipt of
their information. However, it turns out they are able to do so with impunity, because many
of the other subjects, who are not informed, are also engaging in trades. This creates a large
amount of noise trades that dilutes the informational content of the insider’s market actions.
Let’s consider how fast a subject makes a trade after observing a draw from the urn.
Figure 8 plots the empirical cumulative probability of the contract at which the period’s
informed trader makes her first transaction within the period. Surprisingly, many subjects
act quickly, about twenty-four percent are a party to the first contract, and almost twenty
percent more make their first trade as a party to the second contract of the period. One the
other hand, slightly over thirty percent of the subjects do not make any trade in the period
that are the informed trader. Clearly, subjects utilize the endogenous timing of when to take
market action in a diverse ways. The other side of this coin is that clearly many subjects
makes trades when they are non-informed, which is in contradiction to what many rational
theories dictate (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Tirole, 1982).
Given there is uncertainty that the informed trader is one of the parties to a trade, we
examine how likely it is that a given trade reveals information about the last observed draw.
First, we define noise trades as any trade between two non-informed traders. Trades that
8The test-statistic is z ∗ ( mnm+n )
0.5 where m and n are the number of observed Black and Red draws
respective, and z is the absolute of maximum difference between the two empirical CDF’s. The p-value of
this statistic is exp(−2 ∗ z2).
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involve the informed trader will be classified as either informative or non-informative. We
argue an informative trade occurs when the informed trader takes an action that allows
others (conditional upon knowing the trader’s action) to infer the period’s signal.
We start be assuming that any impact a signal has on price is realized by the end of the
trading period and is reflected in the closing price. So, when assessing the informational
content of a trade, we consider whether the price is an increase or decrease from closing
price of the previous period. We ask under what types of actions and circumstances does
a informed trader reveal the value of her signal? Consider the following scenario - suppose
the informed trader buys a unit at a price higher than the previous closing price. Is this
purchase is rational given the observed signal? Clearly, the informed trader would not agree
to purchase if the signal was Black, because that signal would cause her expectation of the
dividend to fall below the previous closing price. However, if the signal was Red, then her
expected value of the dividend will increase, and purchasing the asset at a higher price is
now rationalizable. Thus, we can see buying at a higher price separates the two possible
signals and provides information to the market. Now, let’s suppose the informed trader was
the seller, rather than the buyer. Selling at a higher price is rational irrespective of whether
the signal was Red or Black, hence this trade provides no new information to the market.
We call such a trade as non-informative. Note that there is a possibility that an informed
trader who saw a Black signal still buys at a higher price - thus violating the rationality
described before. We classify this type of contrarian trade also as non-informative. From
similar arguments, a price decrease from the previous closing price is informative only if the
informed trader was a seller, which would only be rational if the signal was Black. Table 13
shows how we sort different trades into different categories.
With these classification of signals, we calculate the proportion of informative signals.
Figure 9 plots the results of trades classified as above with the order of the trade within
a given period - the idea being to examine how long it takes for the informed trader’s
information to be incorporated into the price.
The figure is striking for two reasons. First, a large proportion of trades (conditional on
the order of trading within the period) are noise traders, i.e., trades where both participants
do not have any information in the given period. For example, for the first trade in any
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given period, about seventy-five percent involve noise traders. This pattern continues for
most trades. A second even more striking fact is that only around fifty percent of the
informed subjects’ trades are actually informative for the first trade.
Consider the following thought experiment. If an outsider wanted to infer the likelihood
that the insider obtained a positive signal in a given period, then observing the opening
trade of the next period being transacted at a higher price relative to the previous period,
the chance of the trade reflecting positive information is only around 10%-15%. This provides
a strong reason for the lack of aggregation. The proportion of informative trades is too low
relative to the total number of trades. The large presence of noise traders transacting at
a home grown price norm also compounds the lack of information aggregation as informed
traders can make portfolio adjustments without affecting a change in price. At the same time,
the fact that traders adjust their portfolios in response to signal, suggest that cascades do
not manifest due to herding in terms of behavior, but rather only due to low informativeness
of trades.
The result that noise traders can reduce information aggregation is also empirically ob-
served in Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2009), where they have a treatment where traders
are explicitly paid for creating noise trades. They find that this reduces efficiency of the
market in terms of pricing. However, they do not document cascades of the type we doc-
ument here. While noise trading is not a treatment variable in our experiment, as can be
seen from above, it does emerge as a large fraction of trades and an important economic
determinant of price cascades.
4 Experimental tests on the fragility of price cascades
The informational price cascades in our PVT sessions are quite prominent and unexpected.
Hence, there is likely some skepticism about whether such phenomenon are general or re-
stricted to the specific circumstances of the experimental design. In an attempt to address
this issue, we earlier identified two possible limitations in our experimental design section:
information monopoly of the signal for each trader, and the fraction of traders who ob-
serve the signal. With respect to the number of traders observing the signal; one conjec-
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ture is that price cascades rely upon there being a monopoly for each signal, and creating
any competition for informational rents and induces full information aggregation (Holden
and Subrahmanyam, 1992, 1994). A second conjecture is that increasing ratio of informed
traders to non-informed traders will reduces the amount of noise trade, suggesting a con-
tinuous increase in the rate of information aggregation. Our 2SIG and 4SIG design allows
us to evaluate these two conjectures. The 2SIG treatment allows us to measure the effect
of breaking the monopoly of the informed trader (Hypothesis 6), and the 4SIG treatment
permits identification of increasing the fraction of informed traders (Hypothesis 5).
Note that in both these cases, apart from breaking the monopoly and increasing the frac-
tion of insiders, we also increase the precision of the signals of each insider. Other theoretical
literature suggests that increasing the precision of insiders may induce better aggregation
(Diamond and Verrecchia (1981),Vives (1995)). We will test for possible confounding effects
of increased precision in a later section.
4.1 Impacts on informational price cascades
Again, we start by considering time series plots of all trade prices and fundamental value
for both the 2SIG and 4SIG sessions, Figures 10 and 11. Casual inspection of the 2SIG
plots clearly reveals price cascades that span across multiple markets in three out of four
of the sessions, and a possible price cascade in Market 2 of the remaining session. This
suggests that removing the monopoly of the informed trader is not sufficient to preclude the
formation of price cascades. In contrast, we don’t observe any multi-period price cascades
in the 4SIG sessions. Although there is some suggested price inertia in the early periods of
some markets, and often - but not always - the movement of price is towards fundamental
value in later periods of the market. This movement from a price norm early in the market
towards fundamental value later in the market suggests that having one-half the subjects
observe each signal and subsequently subjects information reaching a precision level, the
cascade phenomenon breaks.
Next, we quantitatively evaluate the presence of information aggregation by examining
the correlation between all contract prices and fundamental value, which Table 14 presents.
The evidence is quite negative for information aggregation in the 2SIG treatment. Overall,
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the correlation is virtually zero, and when conditioning upon the market number we have
no increasing trend, and two out of three markets exhibit negative correlation. This brings
of our next result.
Result 5. Monopoly over each signal is not necessary for the formation of informational
price cascades. We reject Hypothesis 6 that lack of informational monopoly would result in
aggregation of information.
On the other hand, there is significant and positive correlation for all three markets and
overall for the 4SIG treatment; and we see higher correlations in Markets 2 and 3 versus
Market 1. However, these levels are lower than those for the PUB treatment. Thus, the
2SIG treatment appears to exhibit zero information aggregation like the PVT treatment,
and the 4SIG treatment seems to generate partial information aggregation relative to the
PUB treatment.
To further corroborate this, we ran the same empirical specifications in terms of price
difference (Equation 1) and price levels9 (Equation 2) in Table 16.10 First, we find that 2SIG
results are similar to those of the PVT treatment. In the price difference and price level
regressions, the coefficients for change in fundamental value are never significant. Further,
price level regressions in Table 16 show that 2SIG prices are a session specific mean reversion
processes, with stationary prices at which cascades form. The results for 4SIG reveal that
information is starts to aggregate and price responds to new information and the correspond-
ing change in value, albeit not as strongly as the PUB treatment. The coefficient for ∆Vsmt
is significant in both price difference and level regressions, but we note an interesting varia-
tion in its value depending upon the price measure used. For mean and median price, the
coefficient is roughly half the of the value estimated in the PUB treatments; however, when
closing price is used the coefficient is almost the same as the PUB treatments. The suggests,
with half of the subjects informed, there is movement of prices towards fundamental value
within a market period.
9In this case we report regressions without the ∆Vsm,t−1 variable. With only four sessions in each
treatment we wished to utilize as much data as possible, and the coefficient was not significant in unreported
regressions.
10In unreported results, we perform all the alternative tests including examining the impact of bubbles
and learning on information aggregation, and find no effects.
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4.2 Portfolio effects in 2SIG and 4SIG treatments
The lack of difference in the 2SIG treatment and the PVT treatment, and the increasing ag-
gregation in the 4SIG treatment naturally lead us to the question whether subjects portfolio
decisions and earnings reflect herding behavior. First, we examine if the number of asset
units held at the market conclusion is similar to the PVT treatment. The results presented
in table 17, report final asset holdings conditional on information and market. We divide
traders based on the composition of the signals they received over the course of the market.
For the 4SIG session, those who received more Red signals than Black as classified as Favor
Red, those that received more Black than Red signals are classified as Favor Black, and those
that received an equal number of Red and Black signals are classified as Neutral. The results
show a similar pattern of reaction to information as with the PVT treatment in Table 11. In
particular, participants who get net positive information increase their holdings of the risky
asset and those with net negative information decrease their holdings of the risky asset.
Next we provide, in Figure 12, histograms of trades classified into informative, non-
informative and noise trades. While the 2SIG treatment is quite similar to the PVT treat-
ment, the 4SIG treatment strikingly differs with a visibly higher ratio of informed to noise
trades. To see this more clearly, we compute for a given period the ratio of the number
of informative trades to the total number of trades. We report the average ratio all three
treatments (PVT, 2SIG, and 4SIG) by market and overall in Table 18. The results highlight
that increasing the fraction of informed traders increases the likelihood of informed trad-
ing significantly and this is possibly one mechanism of the greater aggregation of the 4SIG
treatment relative to the 2SIG and PVT treatments.
4.3 Exploration into the sources of aggregation
As mentioned earlier, the 2SIG and 4SIG treatments differ from the PVT treatment among
several dimensions: (1) competition among insiders, (2) greater precision of inside informa-
tion, and (3) larger fraction of informed traders relative to total traders. We have already
rejected the role of competition among insiders as being the an important factor in the lack
of aggregation. Here we focus on the role of the fraction of insiders, while also investigating
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the confounding effect of increased precision.
The empirical specification is similar to that of Equations 1 and 2, except that we interact
the changes in ∆Vsmt with percentage informed defined as follows.In the PUB market, one
hundred percent of the traders get information in each period and thus the proportion is
one. In the PVT treatment, this proportion is 1
8
, in the 2SIG treatment, the proportion is
2
8
, and in the 4SIG treatment, the proportion is likewise 4
8
. We use this variable ‘proportion
of informed traders’ as the proxy for fraction of informed traders. The results are presented
in Table 19. In an alternate specification, we also formally test Hypothesis 5 by interacting
a dummy variable for the treatment with ∆Vsmt. We find that percentage informed has a
positive impact of aggregation thereby implying that finding support for Hypothesis 5. As
a separate test of the same hypothesis, we find that interaction of ∆Vsmt with the dummies
for the different treatment are supported, although not completely. The difference between
the PVT and 2SIG is not significant, although the differences between PVT and 4SIG, and
2SIG and 4SIG are significant. These results are robust to excluding the public treatment
from the regression analysis. Further, we can now state our final result.
Result 6. We find partial support for Hypothesis 5.: The ranking of information aggregation
is 4SIG, 2SIG and PVT, however, there is no difference between aggregation in the 2SIG
and PVT treatments.
One confounding effect in these regressions is that traders also have increased precision of
signals as we go from PVT to 4SIG. To measure individual precision, we define the following
variable. At the end of each period, we compute the maximum of the absolute value of the
signal of all the traders in the market. Thus,
Maximum Precisionsmt = Max
i
|#R(i)smt −#B(i)smt|, (3)
where #R(i) and #B(i) are the number of Red and Black chips respectively that trader
i has already observed in session s, market m, and by period t. For the PUB treatment,
this would just be the equal to the absolute value of the total number of red signals and
the total number of black signals. For the PVT treatment, since each trader always has
only one signal, this would just be equal to 1. For the two and four signal treatments, this
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would vary from period to period depending on the precision of the trader with the most
precise signal. When this measure of precision is interacted with change in value, it has a
positive and significant effect on aggregation, but the percentage informed continues to be
significant (results not reported). However, in a sub-sample analysis, that excludes the public
treatment, the interaction of precision with change in value is not significant. Thus, while
precision may be increasing aggregation, the current experimental set up is not powerful
enough to detect this. On the other hand, increasing precision does not impact the result
on the percentage of informed traders resulting in greater aggregation for the sub-sample.
5 Conclusion
We conclude by discussing how our study and findings relate to the existing experimental
literature, and suggesting future directions of inquiry. The initial premise of our study was to
ask if the long lived asset and accompanying long sequence of informative private information
of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, leads to full aggregation or leads to cascades, when
placed in a market with decentralized private information and effectively replacing social with
market learning. They were strong precedents that such information aggregations failures
would not occur. In particular, the continuous double auction is heralded in the experimental
economics community for the large domain of economic environments in which it successfully
implements competitive equilibrium outcomes (Smith, 2010).
In terms of experimental setup, we choose aggregate uncertainty, a long lived asset and
homogeneous valuations for the asset. We are motivated in these aspects to a large extent
by examining making the experimental set up as close as possible to real life markets where
most of these conditions are satisfied. A critical distinction from the prior literature is that
we allow completely endogenous timing of trades, both for insiders as well as outsiders. This
allows substantial freedom for insider to time their trades as well as non informed traders to
trade.
In experimental tests of fully revealing rational equilibrium, information robustly ag-
gregates and efficient pricing occurs with homogeneous preferences, one-period lived assets,
and aggregate certainty (Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988)). In studies that follow the same
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Plott and Sunder design except adopt environments with aggregate uncertainty, such as
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) and Bruguier, Quartz, and Bossaerts (2010), information
aggregation and the rational equilibrium solutions do not perform as well, although still
better than competing theories. Likewise, Copeland and Friedman (1987, 1991) examine in-
formation aggregation in a four period asset market and find weaker support for the rational
expectations equilibrium. Further, in the social learning literature, it’s been robustly shown
theoretically and experimentally that allowing for rational market makers who endogenously
set price information fully aggregates (Avery and Zemsky (1998), Drehmann, Oechssler, and
Rider (2005), Cipriani and Guarino (2005)). Therefore, a priori, it should be reasonable to
anticipate that information should aggregate in our experimental set up.
It is hard to imagine our results could be more different. We observed essentially zero
aggregation when there was a monopoly or duopoly on the signals. Moreover, price was the
opposite of noisy; in almost every case market prices locked in on a home grown expectation
which would span across multiple markets in a session.
What are the potential reasons for the informational cascades that we observe? Hints
can be found in prior literature. For example, one of the modeling choices we make is
to have aggregate uncertainty. A particularly interesting form of aggregate uncertainty is
not the identification of the true state by pooling informed traders information, but rather
if there are insiders at all. Camerer and Weigelt (1991) conducted experiments in which
informed traders were given the realized state of the world before trading, however, there
was uncertainty as to whether there would be any insiders. In this setting, sometimes when
there was no informed trader, prices would move to an equilibrium that corresponded to
a state for when there were informed traders and a particular realized signal. These false
equilibrium outcomes are called information mirages. Likewise, using a similar experimental
set up with signals that can be purchased for a cost, Hey and Morone (2004) document that
there is significant price volatility that increase with level of signal cost for the signal, the are
a number of bubbles in low dividend states, and occasionally there were mirages (or herds
in this case) with price converging to the wrong dividend value.
Another study to our experimental set up is Barner, Feri, and Plott (2006), with which
we share many elements except aggregate certainty is achieved in the last period of the
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market. Subjects have homogeneous values for the four possible dividend levels. However,
there are always multiple informed traders each period - so there is no treatment like our
PVT one. With this structure, they find much more support for the rational expectation
equilibrium and information aggregation hypothesis than we do, although they do find some
bubbles (price moving the opposite direction of the signal) and mirages (price moves in the
direction suggested by the signal but to the wrong price). The above suggest that aggregate
uncertainty plays an important role in the formation of information cascades.
Another potential reason is the endogenous timing of trades that informed traders have.
The only effort we are aware of that incorporate flexible competitive prices with endogenous
timing is the experimental study by Park and Sgroi (2009) in which subjects are provided
signals of heterogeneous strength prior to trading. Their focus however is on the effects of
differentially precise signals and its impact on the actions of insiders. However, it should be
noted that a subject can make at most two transactions and therefore is still different from
the experiment in this paper.
This complete freedom for timing of trades creates a large amount of trading, both for
insiders as well as for noise trades. Theoretically, we know that this timing option should
create partial aggregation (Kyle (1989)) but not cascades. Empirically, Bloomfield, O’Hara,
and Saar (2009) observe that when the number of non-informed traders increases price
efficiency is reduced when the realized value is far from the prior expected value, but price
efficiency increases when that difference is small. Further, informed traders tend to wait
until the latter part of the period to trade. While we do not observe a temporal pattern
of insider trading within a round, and the noise trading is not a treatment variable in our
experimental set up, we document similar results except that in our set up, this actually
leads to cascades. Thus, the endogenous timing option for insider trading appears also be
an important ingredient for informational cascades.
One potential concern of our results is their robustness to biases on account of subject’s
inconsistency with Bayesian updating. There are a number of studies that investigate this
aspect in the context of market pricing experiments - for example, Camerer (1987), using a
single period asset with found that Bayesian pricing did reasonably well, although there were
large variances, and some evidence of the representativeness heuristic. Gillete et al. (1999)
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is one of the earliest studies with long lived assets. Their experimental set up allows them to
distinguish between judgment biases and pricing biases. They find evidence for both. This
point is also made by Caginalp et al. (2008) who study markets for a two-period lived asset
and avoid the Bayesian updating issue altogether by simply giving subjects new probabilities
for the two possible dividend values after the first period. In this case, they find that prices
under-react significantly and correlate highly with the period one prices. However, there are
no strong a-priori reasons to believe that lack of Bayesian updating would impact the private
treatment much more than the public treatment.
Clearly, we have answered the question that market learning and social learning are not
equivalent and one should be careful in using social learning models to gain insights in asset
markets. However, our results also suggest new questions. Is there an equilibrium foundation
for the price cascade phenomenon or is does this have a behavioral foundation? In terms
of further experimental inquiry there are several avenue of interesting inquiry including
sequences of shorter lived assets, settings with aggregate certainty, and introducing public
signals along side private ones to see if that triggers price responses that cause information to
flow back into the market. Finally, one would like to know if price cascades can be observed
in equity markets. Clearly such mis-pricing would be important and valuable to find, but
also difficult to identify.
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A Sample instructions: 2SIG treatment
Experimental instructions (Please read along quietly while the experimenter
reads aloud.)
You are now participating in an experiment which studies decision making in Asset
markets. Contingent on your decisions in this experiment, you can earn money in excess of
your participation fee of S$10. Hence, it is important that you read these instructions very
carefully.
Also, we request you do not use hand phones, laptop computers, or use the lab’s desktop
computer except for the experimental software application. You may read quietly if there is
a lull. Please refrain from talking for the duration of the experiment, or looking at other’
computer monitors. If at some point you have a question, please raise your hand and we will
address it as soon as possible. If you do not observe these rules, we will have to exclude you
from this experiment and all associated payments, and ask you to leave.
The experiment consists of four consecutive markets. The first market will last for three
periods and is solely for practice. You will not receive any earnings. The last three markets
will last nine periods each; and you will receive any associated earnings in Singapore dollars.
All payments to you will be privately made at the conclusion of the experiment.
We next will answer the following two questions?
1) What is the asset that we will trade?
2) How does the trading system work?
A.1 What is the asset we will trade?
In each market, there is a single type of asset you can buy or sell. This asset only pays a
dividend after the last round, and this dividend will either be $0 or $1. The asset holds
no value other than this dividend. Prior to each of the four markets, we will determine the
value of this by tossing a fair coin. If the coin lands Flower face up then the dividend will be
$0, and if the coin lands Crest face-up, the dividend will be $1. Thus, there is a fifty percent
chance the dividend is $0 and a fifty percent chance the dividend is $1. Note, we will not
reveal the value of the dividend until AFTER the last round of trading.
However, we will provide information relevant to the true value of the dividend over the
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course of the market. After each trading period, except for the last one, we will randomly
select a chip from an urn that contains Red and Black chips and then RETURN that chip
to the urn. Knowledge of the chip color is important because the number of Red chips and
the number of Black chips placed in the urn is determined by the true value of the dividend.
If the dividend is $0, we will place four (4) Red and eight (8) Black chips in the bowl. On
other hand, if the dividend is $1, we will place eight (8) Red chips and four (4) Black chips in
the urn. Only after the last trading period, will we permit a trader to examine and confirm
the contents of the bowl if they request.
Each time we draw a chip, we will reveal the color only to a pair of participants, who are
randomly matched with each other. The order in which the pairs are given the information is
randomly determined as well. Specifically, the eight participants will be randomly matched
to form four pairs. These pairs will then be randomly ordered to be informed of the chip color
in periods 1 to 4. Then, for periods 5 to 8, the eight participants will once again be randomly
matched into new pairs - which are placed in random order. Thus, each participant will get
exactly two signals through the course of the trading experiment, once between periods 1 to
4, and then once again between periods 5 to 8.
We adopt the following protocol to keep the recipients of the information anonymous.
We first draw the chip in this room but out of view, note the color, and replace it to the
urn. Then we place a slip of paper in each of the envelopes numbered one through eight
(corresponding to the number posted in each participant’s computer carrel.) If you are one
of the two participants that we inform of the chip color this period, your slip of paper will
say ’BLACK’ or ’RED’ (according to the color of the chip.) All other envelopes will contain
a slip of paper with the word ’NONE’ on it. When you receive your envelope each period,
you must view the contents carefully, and you must not communicate or show others the
content. After inspecting the contents put this slip of paper back in the envelope, but do not
seal the envelope. Early in the trading period, someone will come and collect the envelope.
Lastly, we address the issue of what assets and currency one has available to make trades
in the market. Prior to the first round of trading in each market, every participant in the
market will be given five (5) units of the asset and $5. There will be no other disbursement
of currency or units of the asset in that market. You currency balance and inventory of
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assets will carry over in each round of trading. You may sell a unit of the asset as long as
your inventory has at least one unit, and you may buy a unit of the asset as long as you have
sufficient currency on hand. After the last round of trading, the dividend will be paid on
each asset. You earnings will be the sum of your dividends and your final currency balance,
and the participation fee of $10.
A.2 How does the trading system work?
The trading system is a so called continuous double auction, i.e., at any point during a
trading period, you can act as buyer or seller.
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The market view has four areas.
1. The right-hand side of the screen provides “Information on your holdings.” Here, you
will find your Starting Balance (currency carried over from the previous period,) En-
dowment (currency you receive from the experimenter - for this experiment $5 and only
in period 1), Dividend payouts from previous period (will always be zero in this exper-
iment except for the last period), Current Balance, Current Bid balance (currency you
have committed to bids in the current trading period), and Available Balance (amount
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of currency on hand with which you can generate new bids or purchases at current
asks). This is also where you can view your inventory of the Asset.
2. The bottom row displays the sequence of prices for unit of the asset for the current
trading period.
3. The lower left corner is the area in which you take market actions. Here you can
click on the ‘Buyer Actions’ tab to submit a bid price to the market at which you are
willing to purchase a unit, or you can click on the ‘Buy’ button to purchase a unit
at the current lowest ask price in the market. Here, you can also click on the ‘Seller
Actions’ tab to submit an ask price to the market at which you are willing to sell a
unit, or you can click on the ‘Sell’ button to sell a unit at the current highest bid in
the market.
4. The upper left corner contains information on current market conditions (all partici-
pants see this information except which bid/ask belong to specific other participants.)
‘Queues’ are the lists of the current bids and asks that have been submitted to the
market but have not yet been selected. Your outstanding bids and asks will be marked
with an asterisk to the right of them. The ‘Bid-Ask’ Spread gives the current (lowest
available) ask price to sell and the current (highest available) bid to purchase.
A.3 How to make trades?
As suggested, there are four types of actions you can take in a trading period; submit a bid
price to purchase, and ask price to sell, purchase by accepting the lowest outstanding ask,
and sell by accepting the highest outstanding bid. You can also do these in any sequence
you want. For example, you can simultaneously have an outstanding bid, an outstanding
ask, and then purchase at the lowest ask in the market (as long as it isn’t your outstanding
ask.) You may also have multiple outstanding bids and/or asks at a given time.
There are some basic rules governing what bids and asks you may submit. 1) When you
submit a new bid, it must be at least as large as the current bid and you must have at least
the bid amount of currency available. 2) When you submit a new ask, it must be at least as
small as the current ask and you must have at least one unit of the Asset in inventory (Note,
42
when you successfully submit an ask, your inventory of available assets is reduced by one.)
3) If you attempt to buy a unit at the current ask, then you must have enough available
currency and you can’t attempt to purchase from yourself. 4) If you attempt to sell at the
current bid, you must have a unit available and you can’t sell to yourself. 5) All bids and
asks will be stored in the queues, you may withdraw any bid or ask you submit as long as it
is neither the current bid or ask. To withdrawal a bid or ask, highlight in the list found in
the lower left corner and click the retract button.
When a contract occurs, the associated bid or ask is removed from the bid-ask queues. If
you are involved in the contract, your currency holdings and asset inventory will be automat-
ically adjusted. Finally, when the trading period ends, all bids and asks are removed from
the queue (and the associated asset units and currency are credited back to the participants)
To summarize, you may purchase a unit of the asset in two ways; you may submit a bid
price to buy that becomes the current bid and another participant ‘sells’ to you, or you may
choose to ‘buy’ at the current lowest ask. Likewise, you may sell an asset in two ways; you
may submit an ask price to sell that becomes the current ask and another participant ‘buys’
from you, or you may choose to ‘sell’ at the current highest bid.
Remember, each market has nine trading periods. Each of the trading periods will last
1.5 minutes. The practice market is an exception; it will have only three 2.5 minute trading
periods. We will privately flip a coin to determine the final dividend value of the asset prior
to the market. After each trading period, we will draw a chip from an urn whose composition
is determined by the true dividend value. After the last trading period of the market, the
value of the dividend will be revealed and your market earnings calculated.
At this time please locate the small window on your monitor titled login. Locate the box
host, it should have a number that is the same as the one written on the whiteboard. If not
click on the down arrow tab and that number should be on the list. Select it. Next, enter
your student matric number into the username field (all CAPITAL LETTERS). Then click
connect. You will receive a message asking you to wait for the experiment to start. If you
can’t reach this step raise your hand and someone will come and assist you.
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Figure 6: Times series of correlation of fundamental value with the mean, median and closing
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Figure 12: The number of informative, non-informative, and noise contracts by trade number in
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Table 1: Expected dividend conditional on #R−#B
#R−#B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
E [d(a)] 0.50 0.67 0.80 0.89 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00
#R−#B 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
E [d(a)] 0.50 0.33 0.20 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
Expected values are rounded to the nearest one hundredth.
Table 2: Experimental Design
Treatment Acronym Markets Show-Up Fee Sessions
Public Information PUB 3 S$10 8
Private Information PVT 3 S$10 8
Private Information with
2SIG 3 S$10 4
Two Informed Traders
Private Information with
4SIG 3 S$10 4
Four Informed Traders
Table 3: Correlation between all trade prices and value: PUB and PVT
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Overall
Private signal Correlation 0.29 0.66 0.88 0.54
Observations 473 338 291 1102
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public signal Correlation -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.01
Observations 576 473 399 1448
P-value 0.53 0.02 0.37 0.61
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Table 4: Inefficiency Measures
Panel A: Pricing inefficiency measure = |Price-Value|Value
Overall Market 1 Market 2 Market 3
PUB Mean Price 70% 129% 29% 50%
Median Price 68% 121% 29% 51%
Close Price 65% 109% 32% 53%
PVT Mean Price 131% 165% 84% 141%
Median Price 132% 168% 81% 145%
Close Price 128% 157% 96% 130%
p-value Mean Price 0.02 0.62 0.00 0.00
Median Price 0.02 0.51 0.00 0.00
Close Price 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.01
Naive Pricing 98% 119% 66% 107%
Panel B: Pricing inefficiency measure = |Price-Value|
Overall Market 1 Market 2 Market 3
PUB Mean Price 18% 29% 14% 12%
Median Price 18% 28% 13% 12%
Close Price 18% 26% 15% 12%
PVT Mean Price 27% 29% 23% 29%
Median Price 28% 31% 23% 29%
Close Price 27% 29% 25% 27%
p-value Mean Price 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00
Median Price 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00
Close Price 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00
Naive Pricing 20% 20% 19% 21%
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Table 5: Regressions for Equation 1 using mean, median, and closing price
Panel A: PUB treatment




Intercept -0.020 -0.016 -0.017
0.010* 0.008* 0.008*
Observations 183 183 183
R2 0.15 0.18 0.17
Wald test of equality of
α=0 and β = 1
33.93 37.25 36.13
Probability > χ2 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Panel B: PVT treatment




Intercept -0.022 -0.024 -0.025
0.011* 0.009*** 0.008***
Observations 182 182 182
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald test of equality of
α=0 and β = 1
3.77 7.54 10.13
Probability > χ2 0.151 0.023 0.006
Panel C: Test for difference in treatments
Independent Variables ∆(Mean Price) ∆(Median Price) ∆(Closing Price)





Intercept -0.021 -0.020 -0.020
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008***
Observations 365 365 365.00
R2 0.10 0.10 0.08
*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance respectively.
This convention holds throughout the paper.
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Observations 159 159 159
R2 0.78 0.86 0.85



















0.259 0.175 0.177 0.40
0.041*** 0.035*** 0.033***
α2
0.330 0.215 0.216 0.49
0.056*** 0.045*** 0.042***
α3
0.358 0.234 0.235 0.54
0.051*** 0.043*** 0.040***
α4
0.397 0.247 0.250 0.57
0.058*** 0.046*** 0.044***
α5
0.396 0.255 0.244 0.58
0.064*** 0.052*** 0.049***
α6
0.441 0.297 0.297 0.68
0.066*** 0.055*** 0.051***
α7
0.609 0.385 0.380 0.89
0.085*** 0.069*** 0.065***
α8
0.446 0.272 0.282 0.60
0.073*** 0.062*** 0.059***
Observations 159 159 159
R2 0.61 0.73 0.77
Wald stat. all αi equal 32.660 19.720 22.810
Probability > χ2 <.0001 0.006 0.002
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Table 8: Percentage of bubble trading periods according to alternative criteria
Panel A
Treatment Market Max. Price > 1 Med. Price > 1 Mean Price > 1 Min. Price > 1
PUB I 33.8 19.72 18.31 14.08
PUB II 14.29 4.29 8.57 1.43
PUB III 8.57 1.43 1.43 0.00
PVT I 29.17 18.06 12.5 5.56
PVT II 17.91 4.48 4.48 2.99
PVT III 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B
Treatment Market (1) No. of trade (2) No. of trade price>1 (3)=(2)/(1) No. of periods
PUB I 473 71 15.0% 71
PUB II 338 15 4.4% 70
PUB III 291 2 0.7% 70
PVT I 576 69 12.0% 72
PVT II 473 12 2.5% 67
PVT III 399 0 0.0% 71
Table 9: Impact of bubbles on information aggregation and price efficiency.
Price Level ∆ Price
Independent Variable PUB PVT PUB PVT
∆Vsmt 0.493 -0.077 0.500 -0.050
(0.093)*** (0.075) (0.094)*** (0.089)
∆Vsm,t−1 0.313 -0.002 0.281 0.099
(0.087)*** (0.072) (0.086)*** (0.085)
Psm,t−1 0.904 0.232
(0.044)*** (0.089)**
Bsmt 0.049 0.171 0.011 -0.007
(0.092) (0.085)** (0.092) (0.094)
Bsmt ∗∆Vsmt -0.238 0.214 -0.183 -0.680
(0.749) (0.783) (0.763) (0.906)
Bsm,t−1 ∗∆Vsm,t−1 0.039 0.833 -0.260 -0.352
(0.030) (0.563) (0.490) (0.649)
Observations 159 159 159 159
R2 0.79 0.64 0.22 0.02
Wald stat. all αi equal 39.38
Probability > χ2 <.0001
Note: Estimates of intercept terms are suppressed.
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Psm,t−1 0.923 0.965 0.965 0.371 0.552 0.582
(0.041)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.073)*** (0.057)*** (0.055)***
∆Vsmt 0.420 0.324 0.265 -0.084 -0.118 -0.050
(0.138)*** (0.113)*** (0.116)** (0.118) (0.096) (0.087)
Market2 ∗∆Vsmt 0.085 0.096 0.205 -0.034 0.029 -0.056
(0.191) (0.156) (0.161) (0.167) (0.137) (0.124)
Market3 ∗∆Vsmt 0.032 0.117 0.193 0.204 0.209 0.132
(0.209) (0.171) (0.176) (0.169) (0.138) (0.125)
Num. Obs. 183 183 183 182 182 182
R2 0.76 0.83 0.82 0.63 0.74 0.77
Note: Estimates of intercept terms are suppressed.
Table 11: Average final asset units holdings conditional upon signal
Signal Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Total
Black 4.64 3.72 4 4.13
Stand. dev. 3.58 3.52 3.84 3.65
Red 5.39 6.06 6.37 5.92
Stand. dev. 3.88 4.27 4.46 4.17
Total 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Stand. Dev. 3.55 3.97 4.52 4.01
Table 12: Average market profit conditional on signal and true dividend
d(a) = 0 d(a) = 1
Signal Black Red Black Red
Market 1 5.51 3.98 9.35 10.48
Stand. dev. 3.59 3.71 2.34 3.32
Market 2 5.38 4.37 8.98 10.55
Stand. dev. 3.39 2.57 2.21 1.93
Market 3 5.53 4.05 7.49 10.36
Stand. dev. 2.52 2.72 2.28 2.17
Total 5.49 4.11 9.13 10.5
Stand. dev. 2.96 2.84 2.24 2.58
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Table 13: Sorting rules of trades into Noise, Informative, and Non-informative Classifications
Price Change Signal Informed Trader Role Classification
- - None Noise
Positive Red Buyer Informative
Positive Red Seller Non-informative
Positive Black Either Non-informative
Negative Black Seller Informative
Negative Black Buyer Non-informative
Negative Red Either Non-informative
None Either Either Non-informative
Table 14: Correlation between all trade prices and value: 2SIG and 4SIG
Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Overall
2SIG Correlation -0.30 0.29 -0.10 -0.02
Observations 285 184 178 647
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.59
4SIG Correlation 0.10 0.62 0.51 0.36
Observations 384 367 319 1070
P-value 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 15: 2SIG and 4SIG price difference regressions
2SIG 4SIG
Variable Clos. P. Med. P. Mean P. Clos. P. Med. P. Mean P.
∆Vsmt
-0.087 0.011 -0.053 0.507 0.212 0.178
0.065 0.008 0.015 0.176*** 0.015*** 0.013***
Intercept
-0.022 -0.013 -0.013 -0.039 -0.053 -0.051
0.009** 0.008 0.015 0.023* 0.015*** 0.013***
Numb. of obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.04
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0.811 0.730 0.255 0.741 0.963 0.997
.127*** .117*** .117** .089*** .065*** .058***
∆Vsmt
-0.103 -0.003 -0.108 0.415 0.205 0.175
.053 .066 .088 .174** .116* .099*
α1
0.067 0.151 0.483 0.56 0.118 -0.032 -0.051
.090 .082* .085*** .065* .048 .042
α2
0.163 0.245 0.687 0.91 0.179 -0.011 -0.045
.119 .113** .113*** .095* .069 .061
α3
0.141 0.205 0.585 0.76 0.093 -0.035 -0.055
.104 .094** .096*** .072 .053 .045
α4
0.097 0.140 0.417 0.52 0.163 -0.029 -0.045
.071 .064** .072*** .076** .057 .049
Numb. of obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96
R2 0.76 0.81 0.57 0.56 0.78 0.82
Wald statistic for
all αi equal
8.22 6.23 25.47 1.91 0.27 0.09
Probability > χ2 0.042 0.101 <.001 0.591 0.966 0.992
Table 17: Portfolio adjustments in 2SIG and 4SIG treatments
2SIG Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Total
2 Black 4.85 5.22 1.78 4.06
Stand. dev. 4.28 4.41 2.54 4.06
1 Red 1 Black 4.50 3.69 5.29 4.45
Stand. dev. 4.09 4.08 4.45 4.16
2 Red 6.80 7.71 7.78 7.52
Stand. dev. 2.59 1.98 4.44 3.25
Total 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Stand. dev. 3.95 4.05 4.51 4.13
4SIG Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Total
Favor Black 4.72 3.95 3.57 4.12
Stand. dev. 3.80 3.54 8.09 5.16
Neutral 3.57 6.88 5.92 5.59
Stand. dev. 3.15 4.49 7.17 5.58
Favor Red 7.14 6.00 6.50 6.61
Stand. dev. 4.38 4.90 4.85 4.42
Total 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Stand. dev. 3.89 4.08 7.15 5.20
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Table 18: Ratio of informative trades to total trades
Mean Values
PVT 2SIG 4SIG
Market 1 6.7% 15.2% 27.3%
Market 2 9.0% 16.3% 30.6%
Market 3 11.1% 18.4% 27.4%
Overall 8.4% 16.4% 28.5%
Table 19: Impact of fraction of informed traders
Panel A
Independent variables ∆ Mean price ∆median price ∆ Close price





∆Vsmt∗ Percent Informed 0.062 0.060 0.077
0.108*** 0.105*** 0.133***
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07
Observations 557 557 557
Panel B
Independent variables ∆ Mean price ∆median price ∆ Close price
∆Vsmt∗ PVT -0.450 -0.451 -0.491
0.099*** 0.097*** 0.123***
∆Vsmt∗ 2SIG -0.461 -0.395 -0.511
0.109*** 0.104*** 0.134***
∆Vsmt∗ 4SIG -0.190 -0.150 -0.093
0.114* 0.112 0.146
∆Vsmt 0.403 0.4 0.475
0.074*** 0.072*** 0.09***
Intercept 0.07 0.07 0.09
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006***
P value for Wald Statistic
∆Vsmt∗ PVT = ∆Vsmt∗ 2SIG 0.912 0.571 0.879
∆Vsmt∗ 2SIG = ∆Vsmt∗ 4SIG 0.021 0.031 0.006
∆Vsmt∗ PVT = ∆Vsmt∗ 4SIG 0.007 0.005 0.005
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07
Observations 557 557 557
62
